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FEDERAL PREEMPTION: GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS
AND THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
This comment is an analysis of Supreme Court decisions in cases
raising a substantial issue of preemption, not including cases in-
volving the National Labor Relations Act and amending legis-
lation. Inquiry is especially directed towards assessing the sig-
nificance of the relative strengths of the state and federal govern-
mental interests involved in each case.
I
INHERENT in a federal system of government is the inevitability
of collision between the policies and acts of the component sovereign-
ties or quasi-sovereignties. Through the supremacy clause,1 the
United States Constitution resorts to a hierarchical system as one
method for resolving the problems arising from such collisions. 2
This comment is concerned with collisions of interests occurring as a
result of the concurrent exercise of legislative power by the inferior
and the superior levels of governmental authority within the hier-
archical system.3 This concurrence poses the issue of preemption,
1 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
2 The hierarchy within the American system consists of only two levels of govern-
ment, federal and state. Resolution of conflicts between the units which constitute
the inferior level of government is the domain of the theory of conflict of laws.
The Constitution defines the relationships between these inferior units in terms of
equality. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). As to constitutional limitations on
the power of one state to assert its interest to the exclusion of the interest of another
see, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514
(1953); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 806 U.S. 493 (1939); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Pearson
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1962). See generally CuRm, SELEMTD
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICr OF LAws 188-360, 445-525 (1965).
3 In the interest of limiting the comment to manageable proportions, considera-
tion is limited primarily to cases decided within the past twenty-five years. Labor
cases have been deemphasized because the preemption issue as to labor has been
exhaustively treated in a number of recent works. E.g., Kovarsky, Labor Arbitration
and Federal Pre-Emption: The Overruling of "Black v. Cutter Laboratories," 47 MINN.
L. REv. 581 (1968); 31 FoRDAm L. Rav. 829 (1963); 60 MICH. L. REv. 1010 (1962); Ill
U. PA. L. REv. 380 (1963); 110 U. PA. L. REv. 620 (1962); 48 VA. L. REv. 133 (1962).
Other cases which involve preemption issues but which the Supreme Court has
not in terms treated as such are also omitted in the interest of brevity. Two such
cases are Sperry v. Florida, 378 U.S. 879 (1963) (one qualified to practice before the
United States Patent Office need not achieve admission to state bar as condition to
continuance of patent practice), and Arnold v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry., 353 U.S. 360
(1957) (employee suing in state court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act need
not comply with state trial procedure rule if enforcement of rule will defeat federal right).
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which arises where it is asserted that a state law is void because its
operation will frustrate or interfere with the operation of a federal
statute or because Congress has required that the operation of the
state law be suspended.4 As employed here, the term "preemption"
does not embrace instances of direct conflict with provisions of a
federal statute,5 although it may be difficult in some cases to dis-
tinguish between "direct conflict" and "interference with the opera-
tion of a federal statute."
The general rules for decision in preemption cases are not of
notably recent origin. The Supreme Court said in 1902:
It should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or by
its legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of the
States, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that
result is dearly manifested. This court has said . . . that "in the
application of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress
in a case where the state law is but the exercise of a reserved power,
the repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that
the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand to-
gether.7
In more recent cases, the Court has tended to employ language
which is not quite so stringent." Even in the heyday of the strictest
' The phrase "occupation of the field" may more adequately convey the sense of
the preemption concept, but this too seems inappropriate in cases where the state
and federal statutes do not appear clearly to be directed toward the same field. E.g.,
Farmers Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
r E.g., Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962). In that case a treasury regulation provided
that when a United States savings bond is registered in co-ownership form, upon the
death of one co-owner, the survivor will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner.
This regulation was held to prevail over the community property law of Texas, which
purported to prohibit a married couple from taking advantage of the survivorship
provision where the bonds were purchased with community property. See Wissner v.
Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954).
'See, e.g., United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285 (1963);
Farmers Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959); text accompanying notes 142-45,
infra.
Technically, it would seem proper to include instances of direct conflict between
state and federal legislation within the term "preemption." It would serve no pur-
pose, however, to discuss such relatively simple cases here.
7 Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902). The principle of the case has been
consistently reaffirmed. E.g., Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
8 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S.
714, 722 (1963): "To hold that a state statute identical in purpose with a federal
statute is invalid under the Supremacy Clause, we must be able to conclude that the
federal statute wouldto some extent be frustrated by the state statute." In this case,
however, the Court held that a state statute designed to prevent discrimination in
hiring on the basis of race was not preempted.
The insistence upon dear manifestation of congressional intent to preempt, apart
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statement of the rule, however, the Court in an early decision voided
state legislation where the case for preemption appeared weak in-
deed.9 That decision may be taken as an indication that the naked
rules of decision may not reflect the whole of the process which is
involved in the decision of a case involving a substantial issue of pre-
emption.
Where the legislatures of both state and nation have enacted
statutes to assert their felt interests concerning public or private
activities, and where a party litigant has invoked the aid of the
judiciary to determine which statutory mandates are to control his
activities, the courts must undertake a difficult and demanding role.
The Supreme Court has said that "where an enterprise touches dif-
ferent and not common interests between Nation and State, our task
is that of harmonizing these interests without sacrificing either."'1
from the issue of frustration of congressional purpose, has never wavered. E.g., Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960); Rice v. Sante Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
9 In that case, Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926), statutes of
two states were in issue. One required an automatic door on the fire box of loco-
motive boilers; the other required a curtain between the cab and tender to ward off
the elements during the cold months of the year. A federal statute, Locomotive Boiler
Inspection Act, 36 Stat. 913 (1917), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 22 (1964), was construed
to authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to specify the kinds of equipment
to be used on locomotives. Although conceding that there was "no physical conflict
between the devices required by the States and those specifically prescribed by Congress
or the Interstate Commerce Commission," Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., supra
at 610-11, and while stating that "the intention of Congress to exclude States from
exerting'their police power must be clearly manifested," id. at 611, the Court held in
a rather dogmatic pronouncement that Congress intended to occupy the field. It stated
without elaboration that there was no legal significance to the fact that the Interstate
Commerce Commission had not prescribed any regulations respecting automatic fire
box doors or cab curtains. Id. at 613. And without illuminating discussion, it re-
jected the argument that since the federal statute was aimed only at accidental
injury, while the state legislation was aimed at protection of health from hazards
of exposure to heat and cold, there was no reason to void the state acts merely because
they operated upon the same physical objects as did the federal act. Id. at 612. Nor did
the Court cite any legislative history persuasive on the issue of congressional intent.
The result in the Napier case might be more readily explicable were the case to be
decided today. The decision could probably be reached on commerce clause grounds.
See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). Or, the Court
might use preemption grounds to avoid a decision based on the commerce clause.
See Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954); Comment, 12 STAN. L. Rav. 208,
219-20 (1959). At the time of the Southern Pac. case, however, the Court's view of
the effect of the commerce clause on state power to regulate was quite different from
what it was at the time of the Napier decision. See South Carolina State Highway Dep't
v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). Nor is it easy to reconcile Napier with the
Court's rejection of preemption grounds in cases prior to Castle, e.g., Buck v. California,
343 U.S. 99 (1952); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, supra; Mauer v.
Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940).
10 Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 207-08 (1944). The Court held,
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But the Court seems not to have found occasion to repeat that state-
ment; rather, formulations of general rules for application to the
issue of preemption are cast in terms of the quantum of proof neces-
sary to show a congressional intent to preempt and in terms of the
degree of conflicts which must be posited before the Court would be
justified in finding state law preempted.": Such formulations are
not to be condemned; standing alone, however, they may inade-
quately express the role which the Court has assumed in preemption
cases. An inquiry directed to that issue-the role of the Court-may
be more profitably pursued by asking what purpose is advanced when
the Court follows these verbal formulations or rules of decision.
The formulations appearing in the more recent preemption
cases derive, as indicated above, from statements in earlier cases,
notably Reid v. Colorado'2 and Savage v. Jones. 3 Those decisions
pointed out that the preemption formulae are applied "where the
state law is but the exercise of a reserved power."' 4 The fact that
inter alia, that federal regulation of customhouse brokers did not excuse such an
enterprise from complying with a state's laws requiring foreign corporations to qualify
to do business in the state.
"'E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 378 U.S. 182, 142 (1963):
"[F]ederal regulations of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state
regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has un-
mistakenly so ordained"; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 881 U.S. 218, 280 (1947):
police powers of the states should not be deemed superceded by federal acts "unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Occasionally, the terminology
is mixed. E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 825 U.S. 761, 766 (1945):
"Congress .. .will not be deemed to have intended to strike down a state statute
designed to protect the health and safety of the public ...unless the state law, in
terms or in its practical administration, conflicts with the Act of Congress, or plainly
and palpably infringes its policy."
12 187 U.S. 187 (1902). Reid was convicted of violation of a state statute which
required that livestock being brought into the state be inspected and certified by the
State Veterinary Sanitary Board. Id. at 138. The cattle had been inspected and certified
by a federal inspector in accordance with a federal statute aimed at preventing the
exportation of diseased cattle. Id. at 140. The court held that the federal regulation
did not cover the whole field, but rather left a wide area in which the states were
free to exercise their power. Indeed, said the court, legislation should never be con-
strued so as to supersede the state police power unless that purpose is dearly manifested.
Id. at 148. Since the state statute here was a reasonable exercise of that power, it was
allowed to stand.
" 225 U.S. 501 (1912). A state statute prohibited the sale within the state of feed for
domestic animals without first filing with the state a sworn certificate setting forth,
among other things, the ingredients and without making similar disclosure on the
label under which the feed was sold. Id. at 508 n.l. Quoting from Reid v. Colorado,
and following the reasoning in that case, the court held that the state regulation was
not preempted by federal legislation prohibiting the shipping in interstate commerce
of any food, including animal food, which is adulterated or misbranded.
21 187 U.S. at 148, quoted in Savage, 225 U.S. at 587.
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the state laws at issue in those cases were made in the exercise of a
reserved power could scarcely have been more obvious; with the
limited exception of powers which are redelegated to the states by
the national government,15 all state powers are reserved. With rare
exception, therefore, every state law is made in the exercise of a
reserved power. Thus, what must be implicit from the Court's hav-
ing purported to give a special significance to the state's exercise
of a reserved power is that the Court, for reasons not expressly
stated, felt constrained to be especially deferential to the states'
interests. Hence, the Court set down the rather stringent require-
ments as to the showing of congressional intent or of statutory con-
flict in order to justify a decision on the grounds of federal pre-
emption.
But the Court might well have taken the opposite approach.
While the powers of the federal government are merely those which
have been delegated by the states, the supremacy clause', clearly
provides that legislation enacted by Congress, constitutionally au-
thorized, shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the laws
of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.'7 Should not this pro-
vision be taken as a demand that the Court be most chary of per-
mitting state laws to interefere with the operation of federal statutes?
Two arguments might be advanced for rejecting this suggestion.
One, rather academic, is that special solicitousness is due state powers
simply because the states were originally the exclusive possessors
of all governmental powers.is A more persuasive reason for only
cautiously declaring a state preempted of the exercise of its powers,
however, is that such a course permits the maximum assertion of the
legitimate interests of both levels of government.' 9 It permits the
15 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (2)- (3); McCarran Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-12 (1964).
16 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
17 "[W]hen Congress has asserted its exclusive jurisdiction, it is for Congress to
indicate the extent, if any, to which a state may then share it. To whatever extent
that this is not so, federal law will have lost its constitutional supremacy over state law."
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 776 (1949) (Burton, J., dissenting).18 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
19 Where evidence of congressional intent to preempt is equivocal or lacking, but
where a close case exists on the issue of frustration of congressional purpose, a decision
against preemption may somewhat limit the effectiveness of congressional assertion
of the federal interest. Nevertheless, it may be sufficient justification for taking the
risk that a contrary decision necessarily will wholly defeat the state's assertion of
interest, whereas Congress remains free to specifically provide for preemption should
the decision be the other way. See Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318
U.S. 261, 275 (1943).
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harmonization of state and federal interests without the sacrifice of
either.20
This discourse has suggested that the interpretation or applica-
tion of the supremacy clause is to be tempered by regard for as-
sertions of state interests. It does not end the inquiry into the method
which the Supreme Court has adopted for the resolution of pre-
emption cases. There are naturally a large number of factors which
are of significance. The remainder of this comment will emphasize
one factor in particular-the relative weight of the respective state
and federal interests-although not o the exclusion of a considera-
tion of other factors. That this factor even exists is often not readily
apparent, 2' but that it does exist and that it can be significant be-
comes clear upon close examination and comparison of the many pre-
emption cases. 22
II
Subversion and Regulation of Aliens. In a decision much criti-
cized by both commentators and congressmen, 23 the Supreme Court
in Pennsylvania v. Nelson24 held that a itate statuteo which pro-
scribed essentially the same conduct as the'Smith Act26 was super-
seded by the several federal statutes aimed at subversive activities. 27
2 0 The late Professor Currie advocated a roughly similar approach to the solution
of problems in the conflict of laws. He demonstrated that if a state, through the
instrumentality of its courts, took a restrained and enlightened view of its own self-
interest by remaining attentive to the purposes of its laws, then many of the so-called
conflicts cases are actually false problems. See, e.g., CuRuaE, op. cit. supra note 2, at
77-127.
21 In fact, the Court has upon at least one occasion stated that "the relative im-
portance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a
valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided [in the supremacy
clause] that the federal law must prevail." Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962).
In that case, however, the state law flatly called for precisely the opposite result ex-
pressly provided for by the federal law. See note 5 supra. The Court has never made
such a statement in the kinds of preemption cases considered herein.
22 In the discussion immediately to follow, the cases are grouped according to the
subject matter of the federal legislation. The several groups can be identified as
dealing with subversion and aliens, transportation, agriculture, miscellaneous com-
merce cases, broadcasting, and federal procurement. In most instances, the subject
matter of the state legislation is comparable to that of the federal legislation.
23 See, e.g., Hunt, State Control of Sedition: The Smith Act as the Supreme Law
of the Land, 41 MINN. L. REv. 287 (1957); 25 FORDHAM L. REv. 522 (1956); 10 VAND.
L. RFv. 144 (1956). Contra, 30 So. CAL. L. Rav. 101 (1956).
"" 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
25 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4207 (1963).
20 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
27 Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964); Internal Security Act, 64 Stat. 987 (1950),
as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-858 (1964); Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 775,
50 U.S.C. §§ 841-44 (1964).
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The Court briefly examined the pertinent federal legislation and
concluded that Congress had intended to occupy the field and that,
since the federal interest in sedition was so dominant that it would
in no sense be considered a local enforcement problem, no room
had been left even for supplementary state legislation.28 Moreover,
enforcement of the state act was said to present a serious danger
of conflict with the administration of the federal program in that
federal investigators and prosecutors might be hampered by the
activities of their counterparts at the state level.29
Uphaus v. Wyman,80 decided three years later, again presented
an issue of preemption in the field of subversion. Wyman had re-
fused to comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a one-man
legislative investigating committee operating under the authority
of a New Hampshire subversive activities statute8' and a legislative
resolution. 32 Upon his appeal from a contempt conviction, the
court ruled that the state laws were not preempted. Nelson was
distinguished on the grounds that the holding was only that the
Smith Act, prohibiting knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the
federal government by force and violence, superseded state legis-
lation outlawing the same conduct. All that Nelson prohibited
was a race between federal and state prosecutors to the courthouse
door. The opinion made clear that a State could proceed with
prosecutions for sedition against the State itself; that it can
legitimately investigate in this area follows a fortiori.3
28 350 U.S. at 505. For further discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes
42-56 infra.
The United States filed a brief amicus curiae arguing that there was no preemption
of the state act. 100 L. Ed. 640, 646-47 (1956).
29 The Court suggested that state officials might keep information regarding sub-
versive activities to themselves instead of passing it on to federal agents. 350 U.S. at
506-07. The Court was also of the opinion that many state sedition acts did not
adequately protect first amendment rights. Id. at 508. Moreover, if state acts punishing
federal subversion were allowed to stand, the door would be open to multiple prosecu-
tions, a result which the Court was unwilling to ascribe to the intent of Congress.
Id. at 505-10.
30 860 U.S. 72 (1959).
"N.H. RaV. STAT. ANN. ch. 588 §§ 1-16 (1955).
2 "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Court convened:
"That the attorney general is hereby authorized and directed to make full and
complete investigation with respect to violations of the subversive activities act of
1951 and to determine whether subversive persons as defined in said act are presently
located within this state ...... N.H. Laws, ch. 307 (1953).
33 360 U.S. at 76. The Court's distinction of Nelson is supportable, but it is far from
unassailable. See text accompanying notes 47-51 infra.
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Hines v. Davidowit,3 4 a case partially relied upon in Nelson,
held that a state alien registration act85 was preempted by the Fed-
eral Alien Registration Act.386 The Court first noted that the na-
tional power is supreme in the field of foreign affairs and naturaliza-
tion,37 and it discussed at length the likelihood of adverse conse-
quences should nationals of other countries be mistreated here.38
Thus it deemed it imperative to have broad national authority in
the field. Additionally, the Court recognized, the area concerns
human rights and freedoms, and the case was thus to be distinguished
from those dealing with state regulation of commerce. 39 The federal
act, said the Court, was intended to steer a middle ground between an
onerous system and no registration system at all.40 The Court there-
fore concluded that the state act stood "as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress" 41 and could not be enforced.
That the federal government had an interest in the subject mat-
ter of the legislation at issue in the above cases is clear; that interest
derives from the Constitution42 and is expressed in several statutes. 4
The issue is thus the extent to which the federal assertion of its in-
terest modifies the ability of the states to assert and enforce their
" 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
3r PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1801-06 (1940).
al 54 Stat. 673 (1940) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
The provisions of the state and federal acts are compared in 312 U.S. at 59-61. The
most significant differences are that the former requires annual registration, the carry-
ing at all times of a registration card which must be shown upon request, and
criminal penalties for non-wilful violation, while the latter provides for only a single
registration, no requirement as to carrying a registration card, and criminal sanctions
only for wilful violation.
87 Id. at 68.
38 Id. at 64-68.
89 "[T]his legislation deals with the rights, liberties, and personal freedoms of human
beings, and is in an entirely different category from state tax statutes or state pure
food laws regulating the labels on cans." Id. at 68.
1" The federal act sought to assure the availability of information concerning aliens
deemed to be necessary, but it sought to gather such information in a manner
which would protect personal rights of law-abiding aliens and which would secure
them "from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance" which
in turn might not only adversely affect international relations, but also "generate
the very disloyalty which the law has intended guarding against." Id. at 74.
4" Id. at 67.
" "The Congress shall have power ... to establish an uniform rule of naturaliza-
tion.., throughout the United States." U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8 (4); "The Congress shall
have the Power to ...provide for the common Defence ....... U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8 (1); "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government ...." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4.
"8 See notes 27, 36 supra and accompanying text.
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interest under their reservation of police powers. Putting aside for
the moment the question of congressional intent to preempt, the
Court's inquiry is directed to whether there is a conflict between the
state and federal legislation. In Hines the Court strongly suggested
that upon enactment of the federal registration act, the states could
assert no interest whatever in the registration of aliens.44 And in
Nelson the holding was explicit that the evil to which the state
statute was applied was in no sense a local enforcement problem
in view of the treatment accorded to the same problem by the federal
government. 45 Investigation of subversive activities against the state,
on the other hand, was held in Uphaus to be a legitimate means of
enforcing the state's legitimate interest in self-protection.
46
The manner in which the Court distinguished between the
latter two cases suggests that the process of decision in a preemption
case consists of more than the bare determination of whether there
is a conflict. The proposition asserted by the Court in Uphaus to
the effect that the Nelson decision turned upon the fact that both
the Smith Act and the state statute proscribed the same conduct
draws support from the statement in Nelson that
all that is before us for review ... is [the holding of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania] that the Smith Act . . . which prohibits
the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force and violence, supersedes the enforceability
of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act which proscribes the same con-
duct.47
"1 While the Court found specific features of the state act to be objectionable (in
particular the requirements as to possession and display of identification cards and
the liability to criminal punishment even for non-wilful violations) in light of the
congressional purpose to tread lightly on personal liberties, 312 U.S. at 60-61, it also
implied that the imposition upon aliens of any requirements in addition to those
prescribed by Congress might frustrate the federal purpose of preventing the deteriora-
tion of international relations and generation of hostility on the part of resident aliens,
id. at 74. This reasoning can be carried a step further. Any state regulation of aliens
over which Congress has no control may adversely affect the relations between the
United States and foreign countries and interfere with congressional and executive
control over the conduct of foreign relations. See generally Moore, Federalism and
Foreign Relations, 1965 Dua L.J. 248.
15 350 U.S. at 499, 509. The Court made dear, however, that the state was far from
being wholly deprived of power to assert its interest in self-preservation. Id. at 500.
16 Ibid.
"Id. at 499. The only acts with which the defendant (respondent in the Supreme
Court) was charged were directed against the United States, not against Pennsylvania.
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 69, 104 A.2d 133, 139 (1954). The proposition
also draws support from the Uphaus Court's discussion of the destructive effect of the
Nelson decision on the laws of forty-four other states and territories. This erosion
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Casting doubt on the validity of the Court's distinction, how-
ever, is the fact that the Court did not, in deciding the Nelson case,
remain within the narrow view of the issue as set forth above.
Rather, it relied not merely on the Smith Act but also on the ag-
gregate provisions of that act, the Internal Security Act of 195048 and
the Communist Control Act of 195449 in order to show a congres-
sional intent to occupy the field. 0 Moreover, those trepidations of
the Nelson Court which were based upon a fear of inadequate pro-
tections of constitutional rights by state statutes, and, especially,
interference with the administration of the federal program,81
would appear to apply with equal force to the Uphaus case.
The infirmities in the Court's distinction invite a search for other
factors which may have influenced the Uphaus Court. One possi-
bility is that in deciding the earlier case, the Court misread con-
gressional intention. There is much evidence that such a misreading
occurred, although no acknowledgment was made in Uphaus.5 2 A
second consideration is the fact that much of the Nelson reasoning
was technically dictum. It has also been suggested that Nelson
turned on the presence of constitutional issues other than su-
premacy.53 Finally, it is possible that when the Court is required to
determine whether a conflict between state and federal statutes is
serious enough to warrant voiding the former8 4 one consideration
was illustrated by the lack of a single successful prosecution for sedition against a
state government. 350 U.S. at 508.
,8 64 Stat. 987, as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-858 (1964).
,1 68 Stat. 775, 50 U.S.C. §§ 841-44 (1964).
50 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. at 504.
"1 See note 29 supra. Whether, when it was said in Nelson that sedition is not
a local enforcement problem, the Court was referring only to sedition against the
United States or also to sedition against a state is unclear. The Court at one time
implied that it was the former, but elsewhere the implication pointed toward the
latter. See 350 U.S. at 505. It is, of course, true that if the Court meant the latter,
the allusion would have been dictum.
12See authorities cited note 23 supra. While as a general rule members of the
Court may not wish to accuse their colleagues, still sitting, of error, the only evidence
of congressional intent not to preempt which was not circumstantial appeared after
the Nelson decision.
"' See Comment, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construc-
tion, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
" Compare Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)
(the Court will not hold a federal act preemptive unless "the nature of the subject
matter permits no other conclusion . . . .'), and Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945) ("unless the state law, in terms or in its practical
administration, conflicts with the Act of Congress or plainly and palpably infringes its
policy'), with Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.,
372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963) ("we must be able to conclude that the purpose of the federal
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in making that determination is the relative strengths of the respec-
tive state and federal interests.5 5 Thus, in Uphaus the respective
state and federal interests in the subject matter which was the com-
mon concern of the state and federal legislative acts, protection of
the state from subversion, may be said to have been approximately
equal. In Nelson, the respective interests in the subject matter com-
mon to the statutes in issue, protection of the United States from
subversion, were unequal; for under the Constitution only the
federal government is given responsibility to provide for the defense
of the United States.56
Transportation. In Buck v. California,57 the Motor Carrier Act
of 1935,58 authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to
promulgate regulations establishing qualifications for taxi drivers
operating in interstate or foreign commerce, was held not to pre-
empt a state or its local subdivisions from providing additional
specification not inconsistent with those of the ICC. In this case,
the taxis operated between California and Mexico, but not, ap-
parently, between California and another state. 9 The Court made
no search for congressional intent, or lack of it, but rather placed
emphasis upon its assertion that the taxi business is primarily a local
concern even where the taxis cross state or national boundaries.0
In this regard the Court found significant the fact that the Motor
Carrier Act expressly exempted from its coverage all aspects of inter-
state taxi business except "qualifications and maximum hours of
service of employees and safety of operation or standards of equip-
ment." 61
statute would to some extent be frustrated by the state statute.') (Emphasis added.)
All of the above cases dealt with federal statutes enacted under the commerce power.
55 The Court stated in Nelson that "the federal statutes 'touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system [must] be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.'" 350 U.S. at 504, quoting from Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), citing Hines v. Davidowitz. In
Hines, the Court phrased the question of interest in alien registration as "a matter
of national moment ...of such a nature that the Constitution permits only of one
uniform national system ...." 312 U.S. at 73.
" U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 (1).
" 343 U.S. 99 (1952).
8 849 Stat. 546, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 304 (1964).
11 343 U.S. at 100. Thus there was no danger that the cab company would be
subject to conflicting state regulations. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359
U.S. 520 (1959).
00 343 U.S. at 102.
61 Id. at 101. See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761
(1945), which held that merely giving the ICC power to regulate train service in an
"emergency" did not preclude state regulation of train lengths designed to protect the
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The state statute at issue in California v. Zook 2 made unlawful
the sale or arrangement of any transportation over the public high-
ways of the state by an interstate carrier lacking an ICC permit.
3
Zook, convicted under the statute, argued that the Federal Motor
Carrier Act,64 which contained essentially the same provision, was
preemptive. The Court disagreed, reasoning that an automatic rule
that coincidence means invalidity would lead to absurd results,
such as prohibiting state prosecutions for robbery from a vehicle
in interstate commerce.0 5 "[N]ormally," it was held, "congressional
purpose to displace local laws must be clearly manifested .. ."6
"Coincidence is only one factor in a complicated pattern of facts
guiding us to congressional intent."67 The evils Congress intended to
regulate (e.g., overloading of cars, irresponsible drivers, mechanical
faults) were those traditionally within the police powers of the
states. Furthermore, since there was little state regulation in ex-
istence when the federal act was passed and the ICC regulations
thereunder promulgated, the federal purpose appeared to have been
designed more to fill a void than to nationalize a single rule.
In Buck v. California, the Court's treatment of the state's interest
was confined to merely a definitional statement: "California has a
legitimate interest in the kinds and character of persons who engage
in the taxicab business in the State." 68 In California v. Zook, how-
health and safety of the public. Id. at 765. Much of the opinion is dictum, however,
for the state regulation was struck down as a burden on interstate commerce.
8 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
03 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 654.1, .8. These provisions make it unlawful to sell
transportation in a carrier which has failed to secure a permit from either the Cali-
fornia Public Utilities Commission or the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Respondent's business was the operation of a travel bureau which included among
its services the arrangement of share-expense passenger transport in private cars
between interstate points. Respondent received a commission for such services. 336
U.S. at 727.
0,49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302 (b), 303 (b) (1964).
0" See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). But see Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
where the Court, in holding that a state anti-subversive statute prohibiting sub-
stantially the same conduct proscribed by the Smith Act had been preempted, relied
in part on the ground that the possibility of multiple prosecutions would raise serious
constitutional problems and that in any event, it would not assume that Congress
intended to permit the possibility of double punishment. 350 U.S. at 509-10. In Zook
the Court did not suggest that the possibility of multiple prosecutions would raise
constitutional issues. It did suggest, however, that such possibility was a factor
tending to imply a congressional intent to reserve exclusive jurisdiction over the
offense of operating a carrier without an ICC permit, but held that other factors
precluded finding such an intent. 336 U.S. at 737.
00 Id. at 733.
87 1d. at 780.
68 343 U.S. at 102.
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ever, the Court's treatment of the state's interest was not so limited;
it asserted that its decision there was consistent with other cases "giv-
ing the state's interest in its own highways more weight than the na-
tional interest against 'burdening' commerce . . . ." Such a state-
ment would seem appropriate if there had been conflicting regulation
by another state to which the carrier might be subject, or if the case
had merely concerned state power to regulate absent congressional
action.70 It is not entirely responsive to the contention that a federal
statute enacted as a valid assertion of the commerce power has wholly
deprived a state of its power to assert and enforce its interest
in the matter covered by the federal statute. What it may fairly
imply, however, is that in seeking to determine whether the con-
flict between a federal and a state statute is serious enough to warrant
voiding the latter, the Court may assess the relative strengths of the
state and federal interests7°a as an aid in making that determination.71
While a similarly conscious weighing of interests does not, as indi-
cated above, expressly appear in the Buck case, such a process may
be inferable from the great stress laid upon the proposition that the
60 336 U.S. at 785.
70 The statement would now probably be inaccurate, see Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), although it was well supported when made, see
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barn-
well Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
704 The weighing process which the Court employed in the Zook case was apparently
this: since the state's interest in its own highways is to be given "more weight than
the national interest against burdening commerce," 886 U.S. at 785, then any conflict
;vith federal law presented by the state regulation is less consequential than would be
the case if "the national interest burdening commerce" were to be given more weight
than "the state's interest in its own highways." It might also be reasoned that if
Congress considered the state's interest in a subject upon which the state has legis-
lated to be especially strong or of a "fundamental" character, see text following note
140 infra, then this is some evidence of a congressional intent not to preempt the
state law.
71 It is not meant to be implied, in speaking of state and federal interests, that the
respective interests are always necessarily different in kind. In the Buck case, for
example, the essential motive underlying both state and federal enactments was the
promotion of safety. Moreover, persons who are citizens of a state are also citizens of
the United States. Thus, if it is fair to say that a state's laws are designed primarily
to protect its citizens and that federal laws are designed primarily to protect
citizens of the United States, there is no difference between the classes of persons (de-
fined by citizenship) for whose benefit state and federal laws are enacted.
It is always possible, however, to distinguish between the state and the federal
interest; each has a separate existence. There is no anomaly, for example, in speaking
of both a state's interest in highway safety and the United States' interest in highway
safety. Further, it is possible to describe a state's or the United States' interest in
highway safety as strong or fundamental, although it may be questioned whether the
Supreme Court, or any court, is an institution which is well equipped to make such a
judgment.
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taxicab business is of local concern (that proposition not being
cited as evidence of an absence of congressional intent to preempt),
although it is equally possible that the Court was attempting to coun-
ter the dissenters' argument that the state act constituted an un-
reasonable burden on foreign commerce.7 2
Later preemption cases involving federal regulation of transpor-
tation fail clearly to indicate a disposition to weigh the respective
interests of nation and state, although there are grounds for sur-
mising that a balancing of interests occurred in Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit.73 The appellant in that case owned
and operated several ships in interstate commerce. It was necessary
periodically to clean the ships' boilers while they were docked. This
process caused the emission of smoke of greater density and duration
than permitted by the city code of Detroit 4 Appellant contended
that the code provisions could not be enforced against it because its
ships had been inspected and licensed in accordance with a compre-
hensive federal system of regulation.7 5 The Court, however, found
no preemption by the federal inspection laws. No overlap was
discerned between the city code and federal inspection laws since
the purpose of the latter was to ensure seagoing safety while the
purpose of the former was to protect the health and safety of the
city.76 As to the federal license laws, the Court granted that they im-
posed some restrictions upon state police powers.77 Nevertheless,
the possession of a federal license has not in the past immunized a
ship from the operation of the normal incidents of local police power
such as local pilotage laws,78 quarantines,79 and safety inspections.8 0
The case, therefore, did not satisfy the articulated rule that con-
gressional intent to preempt state laws made in the exercise of
72 343 U.S. at 108-11 (Reed, J., dissenting).
7- 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
71 Id. at 441. It did not appear whether the cleaning process could be performed
elsewhere than in Detroit or whether it would have been substantially more burden-
some to carry out the process elsewhere.
7 The federal scheme is set forth at id. at 444-45.
76 Id. at 446. But see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963), wherein it was said that "the test of whether both federal and state regulations
may operate, or the state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be
enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether
they are aimed at similar or different objectives." Id. at 142.
77 A state could not, it was suggested, exclude from its waters a ship operating under
a federal license. 362 U.S. at 447.
78 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
79 Morgan's S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886).
80 Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
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the police power by economic regulation "'is not to be implied un-
less the act of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with
the law of the State.' "s1 Moreover, a federal statute had declared it
to be the policy of Congress to protect the primary responsibilities
of state and local governments in controlling air pollution.82
The expressed grounds of decision appear sufficient to justify the
result, yet it also appears that the Court gave consideration to the
relative strengths of the state and federal interests. The Court
emphasized the facts that the city code provision was enacted under
the police power, that it was, moreover, a health measure, and that
the federal act was merely commercial regulation.83 These factors,
coupled with the indulgence in the presumption in order to find
intent, 4 all suggest that the Court might have believed that a con-
flict existed, but felt that the conflict was too slight in relation to
the city's interest in the matter to warrant voiding the city code.
In two other transportation cases, state statutes were struck down
on the grounds of preemption. In Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines,
Inc.,85 the respondent, a motor carrier holding an ICC certificate of
convenience and necessity for its interstate operations had brought
an action to restrain the state of Illinois from prosecuting it as a
repeated violator of highway weight distribution laws. Conviction
carried a possible penalty of a temporary suspension of the car-
rier's right to operate on the state's highways.8 6 Congress had given
the ICC authority to issue certificates of convenience and necessity
which "shall remain in effect until suspended or terminated as pro-
vided . . . [in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935]."87 The Court held
that this provision vested the ICC with exclusive authority to suspend
,1362 U.S. at 443. The dissent found an "actual conflict" since the type of boiler
used by the ships and approved and licensed under federal law could not be used
without violation of the ordinance. Id. at 451 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
82 Air Pollution Control Act, 69 Stat. 322 (1955), 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964).
83 62 U.S. at 441-46.
84 The often repeated statement that congressional intent to preempt will not be
implied "unless the act of Congress, fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the
law of the state," 362 U.S. at 443 (see text accompanying note 81 supra), cannot be
regarded as a meaningful indication of the actual nature of the decision-making process.
If there exists an "actual conflict" between state and federal legislation, the mandate
of the supremacy clause is that the state act must fall whether or not there is evidence
of a congressional "intent" to preempt. The only relevant evidence of intent would
be that which tended to show a congressional intent not to preempt despite the conflict.
82 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
88 ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 95!/2, §§ 2296.1, 2296.4 (1965).
8749 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 301 (1964).
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an interstate carrier's certificate and that the state's penalty would
constitute a partial suspension and could therefore not be imposed.s8
City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.89 arose as an action for
declaratory judgment. Railroad companies operating through Chi-
cago had as a group arranged for transfer of through passengers be-
tween the city's terminals. An ordinance provided that no new
license for a transfer vehicle would be issued unless a designated
city official determined that public convenience and necessity re-
quired additional service.9 0 The contractor engaged by the railroads
to perform transfer service refused to apply for a license and began
operations. The city threatened to enforce the ordinance by the
arrest and fine of drivers, whereupon the contractor brought this
action.91 The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was invalid
insofar as it required the contractor to secure a certificate of con-
venience and necessity before it could operate. The Interstate Com-
merce Act made it the duty of common carriers to establish through
routes with other carriers and to afford reasonable facilities for the
interchange of traffic and passengers between lines.92 The same act
empowered the ICC to establish through routes whenever necessary
or desirable in the public interest.9 3 The Court held that these sev-
eral provisions showed a congressional policy to assure the continuous
and efficient flow of railroad traffic between states and in the Court's
view it would be inconsistent with that policy "if local authorities
retained the power to decide whether the railroads or their agents
could engage in the interterminal transfer of interstate passengers."9 4
81 348 U.S. at 64.
8 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
00 Id. at 80.
01 Id. at 81.
92 "It shall be the duty of every common carrier subject to this chapter . .. to
establish reasonable through routes with other such carriers . . . [and] to provide
reasonable facilities for operating such routes and to make reasonable rules and regu-
lations with respect to their operation ...." 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.s.C.
§ 1 (4) (1964).
"All carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter shall, according to their
respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange
of traffic between their respective lines ...and for the receiving, forwarding, and de-
livering of passengers or property to and from connecting lines ...... 24 Stat. 380
(1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 3 (4) (1964).
03"The Commission may, and it shall whenever deemed by it to be necessary or
desirable in the public interest, after full hearing upon complaint or upon its own
initiative without complaint, establish through routes ...... 24 Stat. 384 (1887), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 15 (3) (1964).
"8357 U.S. at 87. In this regard the Court asserted that the railroads would have
much better knowledge of the needs and solutions than would city officials. Id. at 88.
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Both the Chicago and Castle cases presented serious conflicts of
policy in matters in which both nation and state had strong interests.
In each the Court found it necessary to void the acts of a state or
local government. Neither opinion resorted to presumptions re-
garding congressional intent; neither even considered whether
Congress gave express consideration to the issue of preemption in
fact situations similar to those in the cases;95 and neither discussed
the significance of the police power, as the Court is wont to do where
it does not find state acts preempted. There was, in short, no ap-
pearance of a weighing of interests. Asserted interests clearly col-
lided, and the federal interest was by necessity upheld.90
Agriculture. Two recent cases demonstrate the widely divergent
kinds of approaches the Court finds itself constrained to take to
resolve a preemption question. The federal statute at issue in
Campbell v. Hussey9 7 required uniform grading of tobacco accord-
ing to standards which the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized
to promulgate. The Secretary's regulations provided that grading
should be made solely on characteristics which could be determined
by an examination of the tobacco; historical factors and geographical
origin were not to be taken into account.98 One type of tobacco,
grown in Georgia and in several other states, was designated as type
Or With respect to the Castle case, it might be said that Congress manifested an
intent to preempt any state law declaring, for any reason, an ICC certificate void
within the state. However, the Court cited no evidence showing that Congress gave
consideration to what else might constitute a suspension of an ICC certificate. It
was said in Castle that the state might impose conventional forms of punishment, 348
U.S. at 64, but such conventional punishments might also constitute a "partial sus.
pension." If the state cannot deny the right of a carrier to use its highways for a
limited period of time, it is questionable whether the state may impose a conventional
punishment, such as a fine, which would be equally costly to the carrier.
In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-42 (1963), the
Court said that the implication in Castle, that a federal license or certificate im-
munizes the holder from more demanding state regulation, had been qualified by
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
00 The federal interests in these two cases may have been expressed in part in the
commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment alone, as well as in the federal statutes. In the Chicago case, the Court stated
that the city ordinance gave city officials virtually unlimited discretion to determine
who could engage in the transfer business. The ordinance might therefore have
amounted to an unreasonable burden on commerce. Cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona
ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). The same might be said of a state law, as in
Castle, which if enforced might wholly deny a person the right to engage in commerce.
Cf. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891). See generally Comment, Pre.emption
as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959).
'1368 U.S. 297 (1961).
98 7 C.F.R. § 29.1096 (Supp. 1961).
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14 and was to be identified by a blue tag. A Georgia statute,99 how-
ever, required type 14 tobacco grown and sold in Georgia to be
identified by a white tag. In the Supreme Court, Georgia argued
that prospective buyers who saw a white tag would recognize the
tobacco as that type designated according to federal standards
as type 14. They would in addition know that the tobacco was
grown in Georgia, but, it was argued, this additional knowledge
could in no way disrupt the federal scheme.100 The Court agreed
that the Georgia act did not conflict with the substantive terms of
the federal act but, rather, supplemented it. Nevertheless, relying on
statutory language stating an imperative need for uniform standards
of classification, 01 the Court held that Congress had completely
preempted the field.10 2
In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,10 3 a California
statute prohibited the transport or sale in California of avocados of
less than eight per cent oil in weight. Appellants sued to enjoin
enforcement of the statute against interstate transportation of avo-
cados grown in Florida and certified mature under federal regula-
tions which gave no significance to oil content. The Supreme Court
held for the state, rejecting the claim that the California statute
had been preempted. It stated that there is no unqualified rule
that a federal license or certificate of compliance with federal regu-
lation immunizes a product from more demanding state statutes.10 4
The readying of foodstuffs for market, the Court emphasized, has
always been a matter of peculiarly local concern. In the Court's
09 Ga. Laws No. 557, at 214 (1960).
100 368 U.S. at 300.
101 "[IThe classification of tobacco according to type, grade, and other character-
istics affects the prices received therefor by producers; . . . without uniform standards
of classification and inspection the evaluation of tobacco is susceptible to speculation,
manipulation, and control . Tobacco Inspection Act § 2, 49 Stat. 731 (1935), 7
U.S.C. § 511a (1964).
102 297 U.S. at 301. The Court also noted that white tag tobacco drew much
higher prices than blue tag. Id. at 800-01 n.3. The dissent asserted that the lower
prices actually were made on tobacco designated as type 13. Id. at 305, & n.10 (Black,
J., dissenting). The dissent also took a different view of Congress' interest, arguing that
nothing in history, language, or comprehensiveness of the federal act required a finding
of preemption. Id. at 811-17.
108 873 U.S. 182 (1963).
20 -Id. at 141-42; cf. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960),
discussed in text accompanying notes 73-84 supra.
In the Avocado Growers case the Court stated that "whether a state may constitu-
tionally reject commodities which a federal authority has certified to be marketable
depends upon whether the state regulation 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" 873 U.S. at 141. It
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view the federal regulation was aimed at the supervision of picking,
processing and transportation of the fruit, whereas the state regula-
tions were directed to the distribution and retail sale of the fruit
in the interests of consumers.105 Thus the Court could not say
that the state requirements interfered with the administration of
the federal scheme.106 Treating the issue of congressional intent
apart from the issue of frustration of purpose, the Court found it
to be the settled mandate that "in deference to the fact that a state
regulation of this kind is an exercise of the 'historic police powers of
the States,' ,'7 a congressional purpose to preempt must be clear
and manifest. The Court not only failed to find such a clear and
manifest purpose, but argued that contrary implications could be
drawn from the facts that the federal orders were designed only to
deal with emergency situations and applied only to regional grow-
ing areas, and even then only upon approval of the growers who
would be affected. 08
In Campbell v. Hussey, 0 9 the critical decisional factor is easily
identified: the Court believed that there was a clear declaration
from Congress that its regulatory scheme should be exclusive."10
The case must be accepted on those grounds, and to assert
that other considerations influenced the decision wovld be rank
said also that the principle to be derived from earlier decisions is that "federal regu-
lation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory
power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regulated
subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so
ordained." Id. at 142.101 Id. at 144-46.
100 The Court noted that there was evidence that Florida avocados do attain or
exceed eight per cent oil content while in prime market condition. Id. at 143. The
dissent emphasized that, nevertheless, some Florida avocados had been rejected by Cali-
fornia officials applying California standards. Id. at 166 (White, J., dissenting).10 TId. at 146. Although the California statute was passed pursuant to state police
power, the purpose of the provision was merely to assure orderly marketing and satis-
factory palatability of the fruit; the regulations imposed by the statute were not
related to health or safety. Ibid.
10
s Id. at 138-39, 148-49. There were no federal maturity orders in effect for Cali-
fornia avocados.
-0- 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
120 Id. at 300-02. Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), which involved a state
regulating marketing, restraining competition and maintaining prices in order to
conserve the wealth of the state and prevent economic waste. These provisions were
held not to conflict with federal legislation authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture
to issue orders limiting the quantity of certain crops, including raisins, since the
Secretary had issued no orders and provisions had been made for cooperation between
federal and state authorities. The Court adopted the position that the existence of a
comprehensive state program might be sufficient reason to preclude the Secretary from
issuing such orders. Id. at 354.
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speculation.1 1 In sharp contrast, it cannot be said with certainty
which, if any, factor was of crucial significance in the Avocado
Growers case. The Court first emphasized the strength of the state's
interest"12 in supervising the preparation of food for market, im-
plying, although not expressly utilizing, a weighing process. Second,
the Court defined the respective interests in such a way as to be able
to find that they did not collide. The federal interest was asserted
in the production and transportation of the produce; the state in-
tere.st was asserted in the marketing thereof."13 Third, it was ac-
knowledged that deference was due the exercise of police powers by
the state."14 Finally, the Court found what it considered to be af-
firmative evidence that Congress intended not to make its scheme
exclusive."15
Miscellaneous Commerce Cases. Of the cases grouped under this
heading all but one may be discussed in fairly summary fashion
since they employ straightforward applications of elementary prin-
ciples. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp." 6 held that state laws regu-
'' Cases in which it is clear that Congress actually gave consideration to the
problem of preemption are the exception rather than the rule. A recent case,
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 382 U.S. 423 (1966),
in which it was held that neither a federal statute providing for compulsory arbi-
tration of disputes concerning the use of firemen and the size of train crews nor
awards thereunder preempted state statutes establishing minimum crew sizes, con-
stitutes such an exception. Although the federal statute itself did not speak to the
preemption issue, its legislative history indicates that the question had been discussed
in Congress. The decision in the case (insofar as the preemption issue was concerned)
rested entirely upon the majority's belief that the legislative history clearly demon-
strated a congressional intent not to preempt. Id. at 435. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissent-
ing, took the opposite view of the history. Id. at 444-47.
112 873 U.S. at 144-45.
'
1 3 Id. at 145. The Court distinguished Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315
U.S. 148 (1942), a case in which federal regulation of the manufacture of a product
for human consumption was held to preempt state regulation of the same subject.
The Cloverleaf case arose when state officials, acting under statutory authority, seized
some of petitioner's packing stock butter, a substance from which the final product,
processed butter, was manufactured. The federal regulation held by the Court to be
preemptive comprehensively affected the entire process of manufacture. The Court
declared that "Congress hardly intended the intrusion of another authority during the
very preparation of a comifiodity subject to the surveillance and comprehensive speci-
fications of the Department of Agriculture." Id. at 169. In the Avocado Growers
case, on the other hand, the state regulation did not commence until after the federal
regulations had been applied and, in the Court's view, their purpose fulfilled. 373
U.S. at 145.
" 873 U.S. at 146. The only reason which was suggested to justify such deference
was that state police powers are "historic." See text accompanying note 84 supra.
Compare text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
115 373 U.S. at 146-52. See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
226 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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lating warehouses and warehouse receipts could not be enforced
as to matters in any way regulated by a federal statute clearly pur-
porting, in the Court's view, to be the exclusive authority with
respect to any matter which it treated.117 State regulation of the
wholesale marketing of natural gas was held preempted in Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n." 8 The Court found not
only that Congress had "plainly occupied the regulatory field," 11
but also that the state regulation made it impossible for the Federal
Power Commission effectively to discharge its regulatory func-
tions. 20
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines,
Inc., 21 arose when a state commission found that a Negro's employ-
ment application was rejected solely on the grounds of race, in
violation of a state statute. 22 The defendant, an airline, urged that
the field had been preempted by the Federal Aviation Act.123 Upon
the assumption that the federal and state acts were identical in pur-
pose, the Court held that, in order to find that the latter had been
preempted, it must nevertheless be shown that the federal act would
to some extent be frustrated. In a brief discussion the Court held
that no such showing had been made. 124
Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen25 is no more controversial than
the three cases immediately above, but it is instructive in its thought-
ful conception of the judicial function and in its careful delineation
of the competing governmental interests. In that case Union, a
'1 7 Id. at 234-36; cf. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
118 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
11 9 Id. at 93.120 Id. at 91-93. The effect of the state regulation was to balance the output of all
the natural gas wells within the state. Id. at 92. The Court felt that the federal
scheme was so comprehensive it left no room for direct or indirect regulation. Id.
at 91.
.213 72 U.S. 714 (1963).
121 CoLo. REy. STAT. ANN. § 80-21-6 (1968).
12372 Stat. 731 (1958), 49 U.S.C. 1301-1542 (1964). The Court held that the Rail-
way Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964), was inap-
plicable since no provision even mentions discrimination by common carriers and the
act has never been used to prevent it. 872 U.S. at 724.
12
'Id. at 722-25. The Court apparently did not consider whether a federal in-
vestigation into discriminatory hiring might be hampered by a concurrent state in-
vestigation. Compare Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). The Court may have
believed it unlikely that a discriminatee would file complaints with both state and fed-
eral agencies, or it may have been influenced in that the United States as amicus curiae
argued against preemption.
2 822 U.S. 202 (1944).
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North Dakota customhouse brokerage corporation 126 with its prin-
cipal place of business in Minnesota, sued certain of its officers for
breach of fiduciary duties in a Minnesota state court. Among the
defenses asserted was that the plaintiff had failed to comply with
Minnesota laws for qualification as a foreign corporation 27 and
hence was ineligible to sue.128  To counter this defense, it was
urged 109 that the qualification statute, insofar as it affected the
plaintiff, was preempted by a federal statute regulating customhouse
brokers.8 0 Under the authority of this statute, the Secretary of the
Treasury had promulgated elaborate regulations dealing with an
applicant's character and experience, the kinds of persons with
whom he could not do business, ethical standards, indebtedness, and
other matters . 31 The Court held that there was no preemption,
stating that "in a situation like the present, where an enterprise
touches different and not common interests between Nation and
State, our task is that of harmonizing these interests without sacri-
ficing either."' 32 Union's business was localized in Minnesota, the
Court reasoned, and in that state it enters into dealings with Minne-
sota residents wholly apart from the arrangement it makes with
importers and exporters. Minnesota, therefore, has a legitimate in-
terest in safeguarding its own people, and that is the purpose of
the qualification statute. 33 The federal regulations, however, are
concerned only with the relations of customhouse brokers to the
0 The customhouse brokerage business arises because of the necessity of collecting
a duty on goods shipped to this country from Canada. The consignee of imported
merchandise must declare the contents and value of the shipment and pay the esti-
mated tariff before the goods can be further shipped. The customhouse broker advances
the duty in order that the goods may be cleared. See id. at 203-04.
127 MINN. STAT. § 303.20 (1947), provides that no foreign corporation transacting
business in the state without a certificate of authority may maintain an action in the
state until it has obtained such certificate.
1208 322 U.S. at 202, 206-07.
121Id. at 203.
130 46 Stat. 759 (1930), 19 U.S.C. 1641 (a) (1964).
101 Under 19 C.F.R. § 31.15 (1965), a person applying for a license is subject to a
thorough investigation concerning his character, experience and fitness. If not satisfied,
the Commissioner may have the applicant appear in person. 19 C.F.R. § 31.4 (f) (1965).
The broker is subject to certain duties and obligations, 19 C.F.R. § 31.10 (1965), and
is subject to revocation or suspension if he fails to comply with them, 19 C.F.R. § 21.11
(1965).
1 2 322 U.S. at 207-08. Cf. CuRUE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 93-94,
186 (1963), where the author argues that courts having jurisdiction of conflict of
laws cases should undertake a restrained and enlightened assessment of their state's
own self-interest.
133 322 U.S. at 208-09.
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United States and to importers and exporters and do not preempt
appropriate means devised by the state for the protection of its own
interests. 84
Broadcasting. In Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners,138 a
radio station and a newspaper, both of which operated primarily in
New Mexico but served parts of Texas as well, had been enjoined
by a New Mexico court from publishing advertisements from a
Texas optometrist relating to optomological services in violation of
a New Mexico statute 36 The statute was attacked on the grounds
that regulation of radio advertising had been preempted by the
Federal Communications Act of 1934.137 The Court acknowledged
that federal regulation of the radio broadcasting industry was com-
prehensive, but held that this fact did not end the inquiry; there
must be either an "'actual conflict,'" or "'evidence of a congres-
sional design to preempt the field.' "138 Apparently finding no
"actual conflict," the Court declared that it was not persuaded that
by granting the FCC authority to consider advertising content in
licensing proceedings Congress intended to supplant all detailed
state regulation of professional practices, "an area of such funda-
mentally local concern."'139 Particularly was this so where the grant
of power to the FCC was accomplished by no substantive standard
other than the "public interest, convenience, and necessity."'140
One aspect of the Head case which merits particular attention
is the Court's assertion that the state's concern was of a fundamental
character. The Court's purpose in making a qualitative assessment
of the state's interest, rather than simply defining that interest, was
apparently designed not merely to enable it to determine whether
the state's interest outweighed the national interest, but also to gain
insight into probable congressional intent. Thus, if it could be said
that Congress considered the state's interest to be greater than that
of the federal government, it could also be inferred that Congress
did not intend to preempt the state legislation.'41
In Farmers Union v. WDAY, Inc., 42 the Court held that section
1 2
'Id. at 209.
125 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
6lMId. at 425-27.
137 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964).
138 374 U.S. at 430, quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul.
139 Id. at 432.
"O Id. at 431.
141 See also Farmers Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959); note 149 infra.
142 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
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315 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934,143 which requires
broadcasting licensees to grant equal time to candidates for pub-
lic office and specifically prohibits the licensee from censoring a candi-
date's speech, precluded a state from enforcing its civil libel law
against the licensee where a candidate who had been granted
equal time following his opponent's speech allegedly libeled the
opponent. The Court searched for congressional intent and found
contradictory indications. 44 It concluded, however, that at least it
could not presume that Congress affirmatively intended to authorize
civil or criminal actions for libel where a broadcaster, having been
required by the federal statute to grant equal time to the opponent
of a political candidate who had previously been allowed the use
of the broadcaster's facilities, was prohibited by the same statute
from censoring such opponent's speech. Such a result seemed to
the Court to be too much in conflict with traditional concepts of
fairness.145 To counter the assertion that a licensee could protect
itself by denying access to its facilities to all political candidates,
the Court relied upon the purpose of Congress to promote full
political discussion on the air in enacting the equal time-no censor-
ship provision.146
The result in the WDA Y case seems clearly consistent with often
repeated formulae regarding conflict or frustration.147 Four mem-
bers of the Court dissented, however, articulating a restrictive view
of the Court's function:
[D]ue regard for the principle of separation of powers limiting this
Court's functions and respect for the binding principle of federal-
ism, leaving to the States authority not withdrawn by the Consti-
'-" 48 Stat. 1088, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
14 860 U.S. at 531-33.
'-"Id. at 533-35. The Court did not intimate that it would constitute a denial
of due process to subject a broadcaster who had relied on § 315 to a suit for slander.
A more serious constitutional problem, however, would arise under the first amend-
ment had the Court not placed its decision on the preemption ground. See New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1 6 360 U.S. at 529-30.
"IT "[F]ederal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive
of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the
nature of the regulated subject permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has
unmistakably so ordained." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
at 142. "Congress . . . will not be deemed to have intended to strike down a state
statute designed to protect the health and safety of the public . . . unless the state
law, in terms or in its practical administration, conflicts with the Act of Congress, or
plainly and palpably infringes its policy." Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sulli-
van, 325 U.S. at 766.
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tution or absorbed by the Congress, are more compelling con-
siderations than avoidance of a hardship legally imposed.148
The extent to which the majority rejected the principles thus ex-
pressed by the dissent is a somewhat conjectural point,1 4 but it is
an important one. Implicit in the dissent's view of "the binding
principle of federalism" appears to be a command that the Court
exercise a special deference to state interests and powers for the
reasons that the states were the original possessors of all powers. The
position of the majority may be that the force of the supremacy
clause is an equally significant part of the binding principle of
federalism.
Federal Procurement. A case decided in 1943, Penn Dairies, Inc.
v. Milk Control Comm'n,150 held that state milk price-fixing laws
were not preempted with respect to sales to the United States
Army81l where federal statutes required the Army to make purchases
by competitive bidding except in emergencies or where it was
impracticable to secure competition.0 2 It appeared to the Court
that the exception for situations in which it was impracticable to
secure competition covered the case. 53 In any event, congressional
intent to preempt state regulation of this kind,0 4 the Court held,
I's 360 U.S. at 536 (dissenting opinion). The dissenters adopted the view of Alex-
ander Hamilton, whom they quoted, saying that, "'it is not . . . a mere possibility
of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy
that can by implication alienate and extinguish a preexisting right of sovereignty.'"
Id. at 546, quoting from THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 203 (Van Doren ed. 1945) (Hamil-
ton). This they felt, was such an "inconvenience" which would not warrant striking
down state powers.
149 The dissent's use of the term "hardship" makes it appear at first glance that the
statement was in response to the Court's reference to "traditional concepts of fair-
ness." It appears, however, that the Court's decision was not based on the notion that
a contrary result would be unfair. Rather, its reliance upon concepts of fairness
was to show that evidence of congressional intent was inconclusive, see note 145
supra and accompanying text, and hence it was free to find preemption upon the
grounds of frustration of congressional purpose.
1"0 318 U.S. 261 (1943).
5 The particular sales involved were made at a military encampment established
under permit from the state. It was not contended, however, that the permit involved
any surrender of state jurisdiction or authority over the area occupied by the camp.
Id. at 267.
I" The case arose when the state milk control commission issued to a dealer who
had sold milk to the Army pursuant to a bid setting a price lower than the minimum
as fixed by the Commission an order to show cause why its application for renewal of
its license should not be denied. Ibid.
'
5 3 Id. at 272-73. The Court's reasoning appears to be that where there exist state
laws fixing prices, then ipso facto it is impracticable, within the meaning of the
statutes, to secure competition.
15 Mr. Justice Murphy, concurring, placed particular emphasis on the fact that the
state law dealt with the field of health. 318 U.S. at 279 (concurring opinion).
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was not lightly to be inferred. It found no such express intent 55
and in particular no indication that low cost was such a controlling
consideration as to call for a holding of preemption.15 6 The opinion
also pointed out that states are themselves powerless to resolve the
effect of a decision of preemption, whereas Congress may undo the
decision if it so desires.1 57 The Court therefore advised caution in
the use of the preemption rationale.
In two more recent but rather similar cases, Public Util. Comm'n
v. United States'58  and United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, I'l a different result was reached. In the former case, an
action for declaratory judgment, the United States attacked a
California statute providing that common carriers subject to the
regulatory jurisdiction of the state could negotiate rates, lower than
those ordinarily prescribed, for the transportation of property be-
longing to the United States only upon approval of the state com-
mission and subject to such conditions as the commission might
consider just and reasonable. 6 0 Citing evidence of the probability
of increases in costs and delays if the Government, especially the
military, were restricted by the act, the Court held that it clearly
conflicted with the federal policy of negotiated rates and was in-
valid as applied to the United States.' 0' In the Georgia case the
Court held that the statute vesting in the General Services Admin-
istration authority to represent federal agencies "in negotiations
with carriers and other public utilities"'62 empowered the Admin-
15 The Court had questionable success in meeting an argument to the contrary
based upon an Army Regulation which provided that "appropriated funds may not
be used for payments under awards upon invitations for bids containing restrictive
requirements of showing compliance with state price-fixing laws relating to services,
commodities, or articles necessary to be purchased by the United States until there
has been an authoritative and final judicial determination that such State statutes
are applicable to such contracts. It is not the duty or responsibility of contracting
officers of the Federal Government, by means of restrictive specifications, to enforce
contractors to comply with the requirements of price-fixing acts of a State." Army
Reg. 5-100, l1-d, rescinded, 7 Fed. Reg. 8083 (1942). The Court disposed of this
regulation by asserting that statutes giving the Secretary of War authority to make
regulations "give no hint of any delegation . .. to do what Congress has failed to
do ...." 318 U.S. at 276. Further, the Court noted that the regulation was at most a
direction not to assume responsibility for carrying out state price-fixing laws. Id. at
276-77.
1
rO Id. at 272-74.
1
57 Id. at 275.
1 8 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
%--371 U.S. 285 (1963).
200 CAL. PUB. UnL. CoDE § 530.
'16 355 U.S. at 544-46.
202 Federal Property & Administrative Services Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 383, as amended,
40 U.S.C. § 481 (a) (1964).
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istration to bypass state regulation of intrastate carrier rates and
secure competitive bidding for the transportation of the possessions
of government employees.1 3
Neither of the later cases purported to overrule Penn Dairies,
although both reflect a change in the Court's attitude. The Cali-
fornia case was brought as a declaratory judgment action, for the
California statute had never been applied to the federal government.
Thus, had the Court desired to be as obliging to the state's interests
as it had been in Penn Dairies, it could have required abstention.
The manifestation of congressional intent upon which the Court
relied in the Georgia case appeared considerably less than com-
pelling and was clearly no response to the assertion in Penn Dairies
that Congress could by an express provision assure the overturning
of a case which refused to find preemption.
104
III
The cases examined herein imply that the rules of decision in
preemption cases do not always reveal the entire process of decision
employed by the Court. It is clear, for example, that the Court has
found it proper to determine whether Congress has intended to
preempt state law. That inquiry has been criticized as irrelevant,""8
and experience has demonstrated that the inquiry is a risky one.10
Nevertheless, so long as the Court continues to speak in terms of
congressional intent, the advocate must remain astute to its sig-
nificance. Several cases suggest that the inquiry into intent gives
the Court the opportunity to weigh the relative strengths of the
state and federal interests. 67 In other cases, the Court appears to
have used presumptions regarding congressional intent to avoid the
necessity of deciding other constitutional questions in addition to
supremacy. 08
The search for conflict between state and federal laws likewise
may involve processes which are not immediately apparent. Whether
or not a conflict is found depends upon the way in which the state
163 371 U.S. at 292.
20, See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
163 Comment, 12 STAN. L. Rav. 208, 224-25 (1959).
See authorities cited note 23 supra.
187 E.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Farmers
Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
See note 149 and text accompanying notes 68-71, 139-41 supra.
188 E.g., Farmers Union v. WDAY, Inc., supra note 167; Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497 (1956).
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and national interests are defined, 9 so that a careful definition of
such interests is the lawyer's first task. The Court has frequently
stated that state law will not be invalidated on grounds of pre-
emption unless a certain degree of conflict appears.1 70 The advocate
must therefore attempt to show, according to his client's interest,
the seriousness of the conflict. Furthermore, if conflict is a relative
term, one must determine the standard according to which it is to
be ascertained. Several cases imply that the comparative strengths
of the governmental interests may constitute a part of such a stan-
dard. 171
The Supreme Court is bound to uphold the Constitution. Since
the Constitution recognizes both state and national powers, the
Court must assume, in a preemption case, the role of the protector
of both the state and the national interests. This fact implies that
its first task in such cases is to avoid the sacrifices of either interest
wherever possible. The propriety of its decisional processes should
be judged in light of that duty, and the argument of the advocate
should be couched in terms of that duty.
e.d.g., jr.
t.n.w.
109 See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); City of
Chicago v. Atkinson T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
7°E0.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-42 (1963);
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714,
722 (1963); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443, 446 (1960);
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 729 (1949).
111 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, supra note 170; Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Buck v.
California, 343 U.S. 99 (1952); cases cited note 167 supra.
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